L’Empire Russe représentant le christianisme orthodoxe si longtemps considéré comme étant son défenseur contre tout empiétement musulman. Cela déplut à Napoléon III qui disposait de zouaves bien formés, équipés de fusils modernes. Une entente étant impossible les zouaves montèrent à l’assaut et prirent Sébastopol. et Tolstoï qui était militaire russe fondit en larmes quand il vit le drapeau français flottant sur la ville. L’amitié franco russe ne pouvait résister à cela et quand Bismark, chancelier allemand, tendit un piège à la France de Napoléon III le poussant à lui déclarer la guerre. Il savait que jamais l’Empire Russe ne viendrait au secours de Napoléon III. Cela fut la fin de la guerre et de l’Empire de Napoléon III. Il s’agissait d’un manque de prévoyance de l’Empereur français.
En 1870 les allemands furent surpris en voyant après la reddition de la France, la quantité de troupes françaises se trouvant à Sedan, et leur équipement, qui se rendaient sans s’être battus. L’incompétence des chefs est universelle.
L’autre erreur d’un grand chef apparaît. Ludendorff à la tête de l’armée allemande lors de la première guerre mondiale a oublié l’une des premières règles de combat « d’assurer à tout moment de conserver la liaison avec ses arrières ». Les munitions, son ravitaillement. Il fonça sur Paris . La grosse Bertha n’était pas une compensation. Ludendorff resta sur le terrain et conserva le corps de son gendre bien aimé à ses cotés.
Plus tard, l’extrémiste germanique, Hitler imputa la défaite allemande aux troupes elles-mêmes. En Fait, une défaite militaire est plus vraisemblable.
Que valent nos chefs des armées? Nous en sommes aux allemands. Nos allemands politico – militaires ont une réputation que l’on pourrait juger surfaite.
Le cinisme nous montre des milliers de troupes russes prisonnières en 1940. Puis pour Stalingrad, on voit souvent les pieds ensanglantées et enfouis dans la neige.
L’on a oublié la surprise des allemands quand ils reçurent les orgues de Staline ou Katioucha à multiples canons qui se déplaçaient facilement, d’abord sur des camions russes marque SIS plus sur des camions américains Studebaker. A Stalingrad les nouveaux chars allemands furent presque démodé par le char T-34/76 conduits par des homme et des femmes qui les avaient construit. Déjà l’aviation soviétique prenait le dessus sur la Luftwaffe. Et Von Paulus nommé Maréchal fut contrait de se rendre.
L’intelligence militaire n’est pas récente même si les circonstances leur furent très défavorables aux russes. Les japonais ont obtenu l’interdiction de franchir le canal de Suez à la flotte russe du nord par les britanniques.
Les russes font peur non seulement par leur taille mais par leur intelligence. Ils firent s’éloigner Napoléon en utilisant le principe des manœuvres simples et successives. Un pilote me fit survoler la Berezina. Napoléon tient à contrer l’armée russe mais n’y arriva que très partiellement.
Voici des extraits du Pacte de non agression entre l’Allemagne Nasi et l’Union Soviétique.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was a neutrality pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939 by foreign ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, respectively. The pact was followed by the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement in February 1940.
The pact delineated the spheres of interest between the two powers, confirmed by the supplementary protocol of the German–Soviet Frontier Treaty amended after the joint invasion of Poland. It remained in force for nearly two years, until the German government of Adolf Hitler ended the pact by launching an attack on the Soviet positions in Eastern Poland during Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941.
The clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Pact provided a written guarantee of non-belligerence by each party towards the other, and a declared commitment that neither government would ally itself to, or aid, an enemy of the other party. In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol that divided territories of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Romania, into German and Soviet « spheres of influence« , anticipating « territorial and political rearrangements » of these countries. Thereafter, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin ordered the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September, one day after a Soviet-Japanese ceasefire at the Khalkhin Gol came into effect. In November, parts of the Karelia and Salla regions in Finland were annexed by the Soviet Union after the Winter War. This was followed by Soviet annexations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of Romania (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Hertza region). Advertised concern about ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians had been proffered as justification for the Soviet invasion of Poland. Stalin’s invasion of Bukovina in 1940 violated the pact, as it went beyond the Soviet sphere of influence agreed with the Axis.
The territories of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union after the 1939 Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland remained in the USSR at the end of World War II. The new border was set up along the Curzon Line. Only the region around Białystok and a small part of Galicia east of the San river around Przemyśl were returned to the Polish state from that line. Of all other territories annexed by the USSR in 1939–40, the ones detached from Finland (Karelia, Petsamo), Estonia (Ingrian area and Petseri County) and Latvia (Abrene) remain part of the Russian Federation, the successor state of the USSR upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Northern Bukovina, Southern Bessarabia and Hertza remain part of Ukraine.
The existence of the secret protocol was denied by the Soviet government until 1989, when it was finally acknowledged and denounced. Some time later the new Russian nationalists and revisionists including Russian amateur negationist Alexander Dyukov and Nataliya Narotchnitskaya, whose book carried an approving foreword by the Russian foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, described the pact as a necessary measure because of the British and French failure to enter into an anti-fascist pact. Vladimir Putin has also defended the pact.
By the end of May, drafts were formally presented. In mid-June, the main Tripartite negotiations started.The discussion was focused on potential guarantees to central and east European countries should a German aggression arise. The USSR proposed to consider that a political turn towards Germany by the Baltic stateswould constitute an « indirect aggression » towards the Soviet Union. Britain opposed such proposals, because they feared the Soviets’ proposed language could justify a Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states, or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany. The discussion about a definition of « indirect aggression » became one of the sticking points between the parties, and by mid-July, the tripartite political negotiations effectively stalled, while the parties agreed to start negotiations on a military agreement, which the Soviets insisted must be entered into simultaneously with any political agreement.
Beginning of secret talks
From April to July, Soviet and German officials made statements regarding the potential for the beginning of political negotiations, while no actual negotiations took place during that time period. The ensuing discussion of a potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet Union had to be channeled into the framework of economic negotiations between the two countries, because close military and diplomatic connections, as was the case before the mid-1930s, had been largely severed. In May, Stalin replaced his Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who was regarded as pro-western[clarification needed] and who was also Jewish, with Vyacheslav Molotov, allowing the Soviet Union more latitude in discussions with more parties, not only with Britain and France.
In late July and early August 1939, Soviet and German officials agreed on most of the details for a planned economic agreement, and specifically addressed a potential political agreement,[c] which the Soviets stated could only come after an economic agreement.
…, British, French, and Soviet negotiators scheduled three-party talks on military matters to occur in Moscow in August 1939, aiming to define what the agreement would specify should be the reaction of the three powers to a German attack. The tripartite military talks, started in mid-August, hit a sticking point regarding the passage of Soviet troops through Poland if Germans attacked, and the parties waited as British and French officials overseas pressured Polish officials to agree to such terms. Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troops into Polish territory if Germany attacked; Polish foreign minister Józef Beck pointed out that the Polish government feared that once the Red Army entered their territory, it might never leave.
On August 19, the 1939 German–Soviet Commercial Agreement was finally signed. On 21 August, the Soviets suspended the tripartite military talks, citing other reasons. That same day, Stalin received assurance that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would place half of Poland (east of the Vistula river), Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Bessarabia in the Soviets’ sphere of influence. That night, Stalin replied that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on 23 August.
The secret protocol
On 22 August, one day after the talks broke down with France and Britain, Moscow revealed that Ribbentrop would visit Stalin the next day. This happened while the Soviets were still negotiating with the British and French missions in Moscow. With the Western nations unwilling to accede to Soviet demands, Stalin instead entered a secret Nazi–Soviet pact. On 24 August a 10-year non-aggression pact was signed with provisions that included: consultation, arbitration if either party disagreed, neutrality if either went to war against a third power, no membership of a group « which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other ». The article « On Soviet–German Relations » in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia of August 21, 1939, stated:
Following completion of the Soviet–German trade and credit agreement, there has arisen the question of improving political links between Germany and the USSR.
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
Last page of the Additional Secret Protocol of the Pact
There was also a secret protocol to the pact, revealed only after Germany’s defeat in 1945, although hints about its provisions were leaked much earlier, e.g., to influence Lithuania. According to the protocol, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland were divided into German and Soviet « spheres of influence« . In the north, Finland, Estonia and Latvia were assigned to the Soviet sphere.Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its « political rearrangement »: the areas east of the Pisa, Narev, Vistula and San rivers would go to the Soviet Union, while Germany would occupy the west. Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, would be in the German sphere of influence, although a second secret protocol agreed to in September 1939 reassigned the majority of Lithuania to the USSR. According to the protocol, Lithuania would be granted its historical capital Vilnius, which was under Polish control during the inter-war period. Another clause of the treaty stipulated that Germany would not interfere with the Soviet Union’s actions towards Bessarabia, then part of Romania; as a result, Bessarabia was joined to the Moldavian ASSR, and become the Moldavian SSR under Moscow’s control.
At the signing, Ribbentrop and Stalin enjoyed warm conversations, exchanged toasts and further addressed the prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s. They characterized Britain as always attempting to disrupt Soviet–German relations, stated that the Anti-Comintern pact was not aimed at the Soviet Union, but actually aimed at Western democracies and « frightened principally the City of London [i.e., the British financiers] and the English shopkeepers ».
On 24 August, Pravda and Izvestia carried news of the non-secret portions of the Pact, complete with the now infamous front-page picture of Molotov signing the treaty, with a smiling Stalin looking on. The news was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most of whom were aware only of the British–French–Soviet negotiations that had taken place for months. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was received with shock by Nazi Germany’s allies, notably Japan, by the Comintern and foreign communist parties, and by Jewish communities all around the world. The same day, German diplomat Hans von Herwarth (whose grandmother was Jewish) informed Guido Relli, an Italian diplomat, and American chargé d’affaires Charles Bohlen on the secret protocol regarding vital interests in the countries’ allotted « spheres of influence », without revealing the annexation rights for « territorial and political rearrangement ».
Soviet propaganda and representatives went to great lengths to minimize the importance of the fact that they had opposed and fought against the Nazis in various ways for a decade prior to signing the Pact. Upon signing the pact, Molotov tried to reassure the Germans of his good intentions by commenting to journalists that « fascism is a matter of taste ». For its part, Nazi Germany also did a public volte-face regarding its virulent opposition to the Soviet Union, though Hitler still viewed an attack on the Soviet Union as « inevitable ».
Concerns over the possible existence of a secret protocol were first expressed by the intelligence organizations of the Baltic states scant days after the pact was signed. Speculation grew stronger when Soviet negotiators referred to its content during negotiations for military bases in those countries (see occupation of the Baltic States).
The day after the Pact was signed, the French and British military negotiation delegation urgently requested a meeting with Soviet military negotiator Kliment Voroshilov. On August 25, Voroshilov told them « [i]n view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation. » That day, Hitler told the British ambassador to Berlin that the pact with the Soviets prevented Germany from facing a two front war, changing the strategic situation from that in World War I, and that Britain should accept his demands regarding Poland.
On 25 August, surprising Hitler, Britain entered into a defense pact with Poland. Consequently, Hitler postponed his planned 26 August invasion of Poland to 1 September. In accordance with the defense pact, Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September.